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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RESTITUTION:
RESCISSION AND REFORMATION FOR MISTAKE,
INCLUDING MISREPRESENTATION*
Edward S. Thurstont

A. Rescission or ~eformation
N accordance with underlying equitable principles, restitution is
granted where a mistake has been made by one or both parties to a
transaction or series of transactions because of which one of them has
obtained an advantage which it would be unjust for him to retain.
There are two forms of relief, one·based upon rescission, the other
upon reformation. The first seeks the undoing of a transaction and
the replacing of the parties into the positions, as nearly as may be, originally occupied. On the other hand, reformation seeks the performance of
an agreement as the parties to it had intended.1 For rescission there
may have been no contract, as where a payment is made to one who is
not a creditor. Reformation, however, can be granted only where the
parties had reached an agreement. Thus where there is a misunderstanding between the parties because of ari ambiguity of language for
which neither was at fault, there can be recission of the attempted
transaction but no reformation, since no agreement was made. If,
however, there was an agreement as to what the parties intended but
a mistake was made in the documents which implemented it, reformation will be granted to accord with the original agreement.2 In both

I

* This is the second of two articles dealing with "Recent Developments in Restitution." Professor Thurston had almost completed this part at the time of his death in
February of this year. Nothing of substance has been added. A few changes were
made by Professor Warren A. Seavey, a long-time associate of Professor Thurston at
the Harvard Law School, who had collaborated with him in the Restatement of Restitution.-Ed.
Before his death, Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard University; Professor
of Law, Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco; adviser in the preparation of the
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION.
1
See Abbot, "Mistake of Fact as a Ground for Affirmative Equitable Relief," 23
HARV. L. REV. 608 at 610 (1910), where it was said: "Reformation, then, is an
affirmance of the bargain as it was actually made. Rescission, on the other hand, is a
disaffirmance of the bargain itself. It is the antithesis of reformation. Consequently, a
mistake which is ground for reformation will not justify rescission in any ordinary
case; while a mistake which is ground for rescission will not justify reformation, since
it strikes at the bargain which must serve as the standard for reformation."
See also 3 PoMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., 870 (1941).
2
"In this connection it is necessary to distinguish carefully between two different.
types of mutual mistake. The first is that which results from the use of words or terms

t
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cases restitution will follow to the extent necessary to avoid the consequences of the mistake. In either case the relief may be granted in
proceedings in equity to reform a deed, or to recover the consideration
paid in a fraudulently induced contract,3 or by an action to recover
at law an overpayment made because of a misinterpretation of the terms
of the agreement. In the absence of fraud, and sometim~s even where
there is fraud, a litigant whose claim can be satisfied by the payment
of money may be able to get redress only in a law court.4 For reformation to a previous agreement it is immaterial whether the mistake is
unilateral or was made by both parties and whether the mistake was
of law or fact. For rescission, a mistake by only one of the parties may
not be sufficient and the fact that the mistake was of law is sometimes
I
fatal.
B. Void and Voidable Transactions
Since the right to restituti<;m is normally equitable, it will not operate
against subsequent bona fide transferees for value nor against the other
party to the transaction if he has,changed his position and was guilty of no
misrepresentation. It is to be noted, however, that there are transactions described as "void," that is, those from which no transfer of
a title or right results. Aside from cases of illegality and incapacity,
a transaction is void in this sense because of mistake only if its nature
is entirely misunderstood by one party who is without fault. 5 Where,
in the contract which fail to express the actu;il understanding of the parties, but is
nevertheless signed by them in ignorance of the variance. The second is a mutual
mistaken assumption of fact external to the contract, which may exist without in any
way contradicting the complete understanding of the parties as to the actual contents
of the document which they signed." Justin Miller, J., in Howenstein Realty Corporation v. Richardson, (App. D.C. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 803 at 805.
8
Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 3II U.S. 282, 61 S.Ct. 229, 233
(1940), citing, inter alia, 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 1525 et seq. (1936);
Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N.E. 243 (1922).
4
5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1370, et seq. (1936).
5
2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §475 (1932). l WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev.
ed.,§ 95 A (1936), 5 id.,§§ 1488, 1489, 1541 (1936). See C.l.T. Corporation v.
Panac, 25 Cal. (2d) 547, 154 P. (2d) 710 (1944) (defendant held not liable to bona fide
purchaser of a "note" which he, an illiterate, executed without negligence and in
reliance on a fraudulent statement by the purported payee that it was merely a contract for repairs which could not be begun until his signature was obtained); Backus
v. Sessions, 17 Cal. (2d) 380, II0 P. (2d) 51 (1941) (release held void because
executed shortly after an accident when signer was in a dazed and semi-conscious condition with no knowledge of its contents); Premeaux v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc.,
144 Tex. 558, 192 S.W. (2d) 138 (1946). (A seaman suffering from tuberculosis
signed a release, not understanding its nature. Held, not binding upon him, particularly
. because seamen are considered as wards of Admiralty and a release executed by a
seaman is not valid unless his employer sustains the burden of proving that it was fairly
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however, the transaction is understood but a mistake is made in the
reason for entering into it, whether because of fraud or otherwise, or
where there is fault in not understanding the nature of the transaction,
it is merely voidable by the mistaken party. 6 In these cases he can, if
he so desires; make the transaction fully effective by ratification; 7 in
any event it is binding upon him with reference to one in the position
of a bona fide purchaser or one who has innocently changed his position.8 A transaction may be voidable because of a self-induced mistake
by one or both of the parties, or because of a misrepresentation either
honestly or fraudulently made by one of them. Whether or not restitution is granted may depend upon the cause of the mistake, its size,
or its mutuality or lack of mutuality.
made and fully comprehended by the seaman.) Sometimes it may be necessary to
obtain a decree declaring a certain document to be void in order to remove a cloud on
title. In Jones v. Jones, 158 Kan.· 196, 146 P. (2d) 405 (1944), cancellation was
granted of a quitclaim deed of land signed by an aged man with poor eyesight in reliance
on the fraudulent statement of his son, the grantee, that the document was merely a
lease of the land.
6
2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 502 (1932); 5 W1LLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev.
ed.,§ 1557 (1936).
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Stuckey, 194 S.C. 469 at 473, IO S.E. (2d) 3
(1940), where the court, overlooking the distinction noted in the text, said: "It is
generally affirmed as a rule that fraud avoids all contracts. But it would be more
correct to say fraud makes all contracts voidable; for it is at the option of the party
to be affected by the fraud whether or not he will treat the contract as void and
rescind it."
But see the language of Lord Wright in Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society, Ltd.
v. Wm. M. Price, Ltd., [1934] A.C. 455 at 463. "In Cooper v. Phibbs ..• Lord
Westbury used these words: 'If parties contract under a mutual mistake and misapprehension as to their relative and respective rights, the result is, that that agreement is
liable to be set aside as having proceeded upon a common mistake.' At common law
such a contract (or simulacrum of a contract) is more correctly described as void,
there being in truth no intention to contract.''
7
Bakerv.Casey, 166Ore.433, 112P. (2d) 1031 (1941).
Sometimes it may be desirable for a defrauded person to ratify such a transaction'
and sue in tort for fraud. In Kordis v. Auto Owners Insurance Co., 3 I I Mich. 247,
18 N.W. (2d) 811 (1945), plaintiff, a pedestrian injured by a motorist, had been
induced by the fraud of the agent of the motorist's insurer to sign a release of the
motorist upon receipt of the wholly inadequate sum of $2,000 ($1,900 of which was
by payment of his hospital and doctor bills). Plaintiff elected to sue the insurance
company for its agent's fraud, which dispensed with the necessity of plaintiff's rescinding the release of the original tortfeasor and returning the money received by him.
See also Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Osborne, 245 Ala. 15, I 5 S. ( 2d) 713
(1943). (Release obtained from beneficiary of insurance policy by fraud. He may
elect to affirm it and sue for damages.)
8
See RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, §§ 12, 13, 69, 142 (1937); 5 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §§ 1531, 1538, 1574 ·(1<J36).
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C. Fraud
The most obvious situation where restitution is available is
where a claimant's mistake whereby another is enriched has been
brought about by the other party's fraud. The defrauded party has an
election to abide by the transaction and sue for damages by bringing a
tort action of deceit or to disaffirm and seek restitution. Also, he may
set up the other's fraud as a defense, in whole or in part, to an action
by the other on the contract or to the other's suit to cancel the contract.9
To some extent the present discussion of restitution for fraud
overlaps the field of "waiver of tort," which has already been considered,10 under which head relief is allowed· by action of indebitatus
assumpsit against a fraudulent converter of money or chattels and
against one who by fraud has obtained the benefit of another's services.
Cases in which specific restitution of a res is sought, or where plaintiff
seeks to rid himself of something which he received in the course of
a fraudulent transaction,11 since the claimant ·requires more than a
mere money judgment, are not normally classified under waiver of
tort, although of course they involve the underlying principle of restitution against a tort feasor to prevent his unjust enrichment at the
claimant's expense.12
The requirement of good faith condemns as fraudulent not only
affirmative misrepresentations knowingly made but also intentional
concealment and even conscious non-disclosure where there is a duty
to disclose.18 The Restatement of Restitution, after pointing out that
9

Kent v. Clark, 20 Cal. (2d) 779, 128 P. (2d) 868 (1942).
45 MICH. L. REV. 944 et seq. (1947).
11 In Deckert v. Independence Shares Corporation, 3II U.S. 282, 61 S.Ct. 229
(1940), it was pointed out, with citations of authority, that a suit for rescission of a
contract for fraud and restitution of the consideration paid, including relief against a
transferee which had received some of the payments thus procured by fraud "may be
·maintained in equity, at least where there are circumstances making the legal remedy
inadequate."
·
12 See the earlier reference to the equity doctrine as to specific delivery of a
·
chattel wrongfully withheld. 45 MICH. L. REv. 944 (1947). Waiver of tort so called
is not available in some jurisdictions against a converter of a chattel who has not sold
it. [See cases cited in Reporters' Notes to RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 128, comment h (1937)]. It is submitted, however, that under the priµciple now under discussion rescission and restitution should be available against such a fraudulent tortfeasor in equity if not by action at law, although he has not sold the chattel in question.
The writer knows of no decision on this point.
18
2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §§ 471, 472 (1932); RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§ 8 (1937).
In Rogers v. Warden, 20 Cal. (2d) 286, 125 P. (2d) 7 (1942), the plaintiff's
complaint alleged that the defendants, concealing the fact that plaintiff owned mineral
10
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except in a few situations there is no general duty upon a party to a
transaction to disclose facts to the other party,14 states that "a person
who, before the transaction is completed, knows or suspects that the
other is acting under a misapprehension which, if the mistake were
mutual, would cause the transaction to be voidable, is under a duty to
disclose the facts to the other." 15 A dramatic instance of this rule is
found in Glauser v. Taylor,1 6 where it was held that a non-disclosure
by a seller of land that the land had been filled entitled the buyer to
rescind the transaction.
Similarly in Conkling's Estate v. Champlin,11 gifts of money made
to an elderly and blind widow in the mistaken belief that she was destitute were held recoverable from her estate. The court pointed out
that although the record was silent as to any fraudulent misstatement
on her part "the facts are such as to justify a conclusion of nondisclosure."
On the other hand, a non-disclosure which one has no reason to
believe will affect the other in entering into the transaction, is of no
legal significance.18
rights in certain land, induced her to give them a quitclaim deed under pretext that
they wanted it to cure a technical defect in their title. Defendant's demurrer was overruled.
14
Accord: Haddad v. Clark, 132 Conn. 229, 43 A. (2d) 221 (1945).
15
Section 8, comment b (1937).
16
44 Cal. App. (2d) 453, I 12 P. (2d) 661 (1941), quoting 2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 472 (b) (1932). But in Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311
Mass. 677, 42 N.E. (2d) 808 (1942), a failure by a seller of a house to disclose that
it was infested with termites was held not an actionable fraud, on the ground that
since the parties were dealing at arm's length there was no duty of. disclosure.
17
193 Okla. 79, 141 P. (2d) 569 (1943), quoting RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,
§§ 9, 26 (1937). In Old Men's Home v. Lee's Estate, 191 Miss. 669, 2 S. (2d)
791 ( 1941), the value of gratuitous board and lodging procured by fraudulent misrepresentations of the donee that he was a pauper and unable to earn a living was
recovered from his estate. See 41 M1cH. L. REv. 149 (1942). Both of these cases
are cited earlier in this article.
·
18
In Dusenka v. Dusenka, 221 Minn. 234 at 239-240, 21 N.W. (2d) 528
(1946), a son had purchased his father's half interest in their partnership in a liquor
tavern in consideration of the son's promise to support and maintain his father during
his lifetime, subject, however, to the understanding that the father would continue
to assist in the operation of the business. In ignorance of this transfer, plaintiff, wife
of the senior Dusenka and defendant's stepmother, continued each day to accompany
her husband to the tavern, where she cooked his breakfast and at times performed
oilier comparatively light services, such as tending bar for patrons and doing a certain
amount of cooking, cleaning and scrubbing. She performed these services without
expectation of pay and with tlie primary purpose of easing the daily tasks of her sick
and ailing husband. Her claim to compensation was denied, the court saying: "If
plaintiff had been informed of the transfer of her husband's interest, there is no reason to suppose, under all the circumstances of this case, that she would have altered ,
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Typical of rescission and restitution for fraud is Lang v. Giraudo,1 9
where a plaintiff, who had conveyed land to defendant, induced by
defendant's fraudulent representations as to her financial ability, was
held entitled to bring suit to rescind the conveyance, upon reimbursing
the grantee for her payments made for taxes and upon an outstanding
mortgage.
In Rogers v. Warden,2° the plaintiff, a widow without business experience, was not aware that she was the owner in fee of mineral rights
in certain land. The defendants, concealing from her the fact of ownership, fraudulently represented to her that one of them was the
owner of the lots, that they were of little or no value and that large
amounts of taxes were outstanding upon them and that plaintiff had
no rights to the lots. They induced her to give them a quitclaim deed
for the purP.ose, as' they said, of removing a technicality in the title so
that the lots would be marketable. A demurrer to a complaint setting
up the above facts and seeking cancellation of the quitclaim deed was
overruled.21
-An interesting case is Seeger v. Odell. 22 Here the complaint alleged that a mortgage on the plaintiff's land held by one of the defendants had been foreclosed and the land bought in by the mortgagee;
that this mortgagee and the other defendants, through an attorney,
falsely and fraudulently stated to the plaintiffs that their equity in the
land had been sold to two of the defendants in satisfaction of a money
judgment secured by them ( whereas in fact there had been no execution issued and no sale of the land) and that consequently the plaintiffs had no further ·interest in the land; that nevertheless the defendants desiring, as they said, to enable plaintiffs to get some return on
the land, induced them to join with the mortgagee in an oil lease of
O

her course of conduct or her expectations in the slightest degree, and for this reason
we can attach no significance to, nor imply any breach of good faith in, defendant's failure to disclose his purchase of the father's interest.•.. Construing this evidence in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, we hold that the court properly directed a verdict
for defendant!'
19
311 Mass. 132, 40 N.E. (2d) 707 (1942).
20
2q Cal. (2d) 286, 125 P. (2d) 7 (1942).
21
The court pointed out that not only did defendants make positive misstatements
of fact, but also "when defendants undertook to tell the plaintiff why they wanted a
deed from her, they were under a duty, even in the absence of a confidential relationship, to disclose the facts within their knowledge relating to her rights in the lots
and the true reason why they were seeking the deed." 20 Cal. (2d) 286 at 289-290,
125 P. (2d) 7 at 8 (1942).
22
18 Cal. (2d) 409, 115 P. (2d) 977 (1941); the case is noted in 30 CAL. L.
REV. 197 (1941).•
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the land to the other defendants, by the terms of which lease the plaintiffs were to receive a 2½ per cent royalty; that the well subsequently
drilled by the defendants yielded a profit of more than $ rno,ooo.
The Supreme Court, reversing a judgment on the pleadings for the
defendants, held that on the facts stated in the complaint the plaintiffs
were entitled to set aside the foreclosure sale, upon payment of the
mortgage debt, to rescind the lease and to have an accounting of the
profits received. 23
In Appeal of Robie,24 a widow, who was also her husband's administratrix, by fraudulent statement as to the size of the estate, induced
the plaintiff who was entitled by law to one-half of the estate, to
assign her share to the widow in return for a sum equal to about onetenth of the amount to which she was actually entitled. The court
rescinded the assignment, stressing the confidential relation between
the parties and the circumstance that the facts were well known to the
one party but not to the other who lived in a different state.
As in the cases involving reformation, relief by way of rescission
and restitution may often be had not only against the defrauding
party but also against his transferee with notice. Thus in Miller v.
Graves, 25 a client had made an oral agreement that the plaintiff, his
attorney, should have as his contingent fee a one-third interest in the
land that the attorney might recover for his client. Nevertheless, the
client had subsequently conveyed her interest to another who took
with notice of this agreement. The court held that the attorney was
entitled to a personal judgment against the client for the reasonable
value of his services 26 and also to have the conveyance to the client's
grantee set aside on the ground that it was a conveyance in fraud of
creditors, so that the property might be made subject to execution to
enforce plaintiff's judgment against his client.
A fantastic case where restitution by way of cancellation of a document was granted against a donee beneficiary for the fraud of his
donor is Columbian Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Martin. 21
Martin induced his ignorant young employee, George, in whose life
Martin had no insurable interest, to obtain from plaintiff life insurance
23
Citing RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§§ 28, 65 (1937); ToRTS RESTATEMENT,
526, 531, 537, 539, 540, 541, 542 (1938). When the case went to trial the
plaintiffs did not succeed in sustaining their charge of fraud. See Seeger v. Odell,
64 Cal. App. (2d) 397, 148 P. (2d) 901 (1944).
24
141 Me. 369, 44 A. (2d) 889 (1945).
25
(Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 185 S.W. (2d) 745.
26
45 MICH. L. REV. 944 (1947).
27
175 Tenn. 517, 136 S.W. (2d) 52 (1940).
§§
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company a life insurance policy payable to George's estate. Martin
paid the premiums and intended to acquire ownership of the policy, as
he had done in the case of several other similar policies on the life of
George, with the purpose of murdering George and getting the proceeds for himself. Martin murdered George. Suit was brought by the
company to have the policy delivered up and cancelled; George's
administratrix filed a cross-bill claiming the amount of the policy.
The court held that Martin's fraudulent purpose precluded George's
estate from claiming the benefit of the contract, since George, although
not a party to Martin's fraud, had not furnished any consideration for
the contract, but "was a donee of the policy and its benefits" and "a person, though innocent, cannot avail himself of any advantage obtained by the fraud ·of another, unless there· is some consideration
moving from himself." 28
D. Mistake
I. Mistake, innocent misrepresentation and fraud contrasted. The
legal consequences of mistake and innocent misrepresentation differ
sharply from those which follow fraud: Fraud gives rise to an action
of tort as well as to right to avoid or rescind a transaction induced
thereby and, where necessary, a right to have restitution. Mistake in
the inducement to a contract or other transaction creat~s no tort liability, nor in most jurisdictions does an innocent misrepresentation do
so even though negligently made, 29 although the rights to avoid and
rescind are much the same in the case of fraud. 8° Further, as is pointed
out in the Restatements,31 if the claimant's mistake was caused by the
other's fraud it is sufficient that the fraud was one of the circumstances
28
175 Tenn. 517 at 523, 136 S.W. (2d) 52 (1944); citing 2 CoNTRACTS
RESTATEMENT, § 477 and comment a (1932); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,
§ 1518 (2d) (1936). See also RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 17 (1937).
29
See PROSSER ON ToRTS, § 701 et seq. (1941). Whether a given statement,
known or suspected by the utterer to be false, is to be deemed actionable or whether
it should be regarded as mere promise or prophecy, sellers' talk or opinion, apparently
is determined by the same test w.hen rescission or restitution is sought as when a tort
action of deceit for damages is brought. Note, however, the frequent use of the misleading term "constructive fraud" in the equity cases, especially the older ones, as
descriptive of mistake. Pomeroy uses the term "constructive fraud" to cover a multitude of situations. See 3 PoMEROY, EQUITY, 5th ed., §§ 922-974a (1941). See also
PROSSER ON ToRTS, § 709 (1941).
30
See RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 28 (1937). The amount of recovery may,
however, be greater against a fraudulent defendant than against an innocent one. See
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 155 (1937).
31
2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 476 (1932); RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,
§ 9 (1937).
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which induced the claimant's conduct, but where the mistake is caused
by an innocent misrepresentation or wrongful non-disclosure the mis- ,
take must be as to a matter which is material, that is, "likely to affect
the conduct of a reasonable man with reference to the transaction in
question." 82
2. Unilateral mistake in bargaining. As has been pointed out, unilateral mistake in the course of a bargaining transaction in the absence
of fraud or guilty knowledge on the part of his adversary, does not
entitle one to reformation.83 Nor do the authorities generally grant
rescission and restitution in such a case; 84 although there are numerous
dicta 35 and an occasional decision to the contrary. 36 Professor Williston
explains that to grant rescission would deprive the other party of his
bargain honestly entered into, which runs counter to the objective
theory of contracts.37 Professor Sharp has long contended that rescission should be granted for unilateral mistake with proper safeguards
to protect the interest of the other party.38 California has construed
certain code provisions 39 as allowing such relief, but only where the
other party can be restored to substantially his former position and
subject to the provision that the court may require the claimant to
make compensation to the other party if justice so requires.40
32
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§ 8 (2), § 9 (2) and comment b thereon (1937).
2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 470 (1932). This distinction is pointed out and the
above noted sections of the Restatement are quoted in New York Life Insurance Co.
v. McLaughlin, 112 Vt. 402, 26 A. (2d) 108 (1942).
33
Supra, p. 1037.
34
Stern v. Ace Wrecking Co., Inc., (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1944) 38 A. (2d)
626. Action for breach of contract for failure to deliver property sold by defendant to
plaintiff. Plea that defendant had already sold the property to another. Held, for plaintiff. Assuming that defendant had forgotten the earlier transfer, his unilateral mistake
did not relieve him of liability.
85
Often in a case denying reformation for unilateral mistake a court will volunteer the statement that were plaintiff seeking rescission the holding might well be
otherwise.
36
Notably the well-known situation involving an erroneous bid. See 5 WILLISTON, CoNT.RAcTS, rev. ed.,§ 1578 (1936).
87
5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1579 (1936). See also 2 CoNTRACTS
RESTATEMENT, § 503 (1932); RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 12 (1937). In re
Davenport's Estate, 140 Neb. 769, 2 N.W. (2d) 17 (1942).
88
Sharp, "Review of Williston on Contracts," 4 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 30 at 33
( 1936). See also the separate concurring opinion of Frank, J., in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 153 F. (2d}, 757. Professor Whittier also
disagreed with the Williston view. "The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent,"
17 CAL. L. REv. 441 (1929).
89
Cal. Civ. Code (1941) §§ 3406, 3407, 3408.
49
See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Riverside County, Cal., (D.C.
Cal. 1946) 67 F. Supp. 780, citing California decisions.
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Of course if the error is known to the other party when the transaction is entered into, there is no question as to the right to rescind. 41
Typical of the prevailing doctrine denying relief for unilateral
mistake in the formation of a contract is In re Davenport's Estate. 42
The plaintiff, in reliance upon allegedly fraudulent statements of
friends and relatives of an insane woman that she was without property,
entered into a contract with her guardian, which was approved by the
co\lrt, to care for and support the lunatic for $15 a week. Upon the
woman's death it was discovered that she had sufficient means to justify
a more adequate compensation. Plaintiff's claim for additional compensation was refused. The court pointed out that the guardian was not
responsible for the misstatements and that "the claimant got what she
bargained for whether the representations were true or false." 43
3. Mutual mistake in bargaining. Rescission of a contract or conveyance for mutual mistake as to a basic fact and restitution of any benefits
conferred thereunder is granted almost as a matter of course, although
there may be some dispute as to just what is a mistake as to a basic
fact.4~ In many situations, however, this point is clear. Thus in the
well-known case of Scott v. Coulson,45 the sale of an insurance policy
was rescinded because made in the mistaken belief of both parties that
the insured was still alive, which assumption, although as to a collateral fact, "was a circumstance that went to the root of the matter."
Another obvious case is that where the parties contract for the purchase and sale of a nonexistent thing in the mutually mistaken belief
of its existence, for instance a sale of a dead horse, both parties believing it to be alive.
So where the parties contract with reference to a house which they
41

Kemp v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 568. (A mistake in a
bid submitted by the plaintiff was known to the government official in charge. Plaintiff
promptly reported his mistake, but cancellation was refused whereupon he declined to
perform. He sued under the Tucker Act for money due on other contracts. The
government set up a counterclaim for damages for breach of the first contract. The
court held that the contractor was not liable.) Accord: Connecticut v. F. H. McGraw
& Co., Inc., (D.C. Conn. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 369. See also Lange v. United States for
Use of Wilkinson, (C.C.A. 4th, 1941) 120 'F. (2d) 886.
42
140 Neb. 769, 2 N.W. (2d) 17 (1942). .
43
140 Neb. 769at 778, 2 N.W. (2d) 17 (1942).
.
44
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 9 (3) (1937). Baron Bramwell's notion that
"the mistake must be as to a fact which, if true, would make the person paying liable to
pay the money" [Aiken v. Short, l Hurl & N. 210, 156 Eng. Rep. II80 (1856)],
although still occasionally repeated in the English cases, for example, Ayres v. Moore,
[ l 940] l K.B. 2 78, is commonly disregarded by the American courts. See RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 23 (1) (1937), and the authorities cited in the Reporters'
Notes to that section.
45
[1903] L.R. 2 Ch. Div. 249.
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believe to be on a lot controlled by the seller while in fact it is upon
a lot owned by another, the transaction is voidable. In Passent v.
Peter Vredenburgh Lumber Company,4 6 the plaintiffs had bought
from defendant lumber company a house built by it and believed by
both parties to be on lot 429 and obtained a deed of that lot from the
owner of record, defendant Wanless, plaintiffs giving a mortgage to
an insurance company in consummation of the purchase. Several years
later it was discovered that the house was on lot 426 which was not
owned by the defendant. The owner of lot 426 disclaimed any interest
in the. house or any rents and claims for rents. The court upheld a decree providing that upon reconveyance of lot 429 to defendant lumber
company the plaintiffs were entitled to cancellation of their note and
mortgage which the lumber company had purchased in the meantime
and to repayment of their purchase money and payments made on the
mortgage and the value of their improvements, less the rents received
and the rental value of the premise while occupied by the plaintiffs.
A release for a minor injury executed in the mutually mistaken
belief as to the character or extent of the harm for which the releasee is
responsible is usually held not to preclude an action for such unknown
injury.4 7 But where the release expressly includes all injuries, known
or unknown, courts sometimes deny relief for an injury the existence
of which was unknown to the parties at the time the release was executed.48 However, it was held in Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc. 49 that a seaman, being a ward of Admiralty was not bound by such
a provision when it later appeared that at the time he signed the
release he was not aware that he had contracted tuberculosis by reason
of the shipowner's negligence in supplying improper sleeping quarters
on board its vessel.
In Backus v. Sessions/ 0 a release expressed to be "in full satisfaction of all claims" but given for supposedly minor injury suffered by
plaintiff in an automobile collision was held inapplicable to a serious
injury of which the parties were ignorant at the time. 51
46

325 Ill. App. 260, 60 N.E. (2d) 39 (1945).
Crane Co. v. Newman, (Ind. App. 1941) 37 N.E. (2d) 732.
48
See the three different views of such a release expressed by the three judges
in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 153 F. (2d) 757.
49
(C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 336.
no 17 Cal. (2d) 380, IIO P. (2d) 51 (1941).
51
The court relied on the provision of Cal. Civ. Code,§ 1542 (1941): "A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to
exist in his favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him must
have materially affected his settlement with the debtor."
The case is noted in 30 CAL. L. REv. I I I (1941), where it is suggested that
the result ought not to have been the same had the release specifically included "all
47
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4. Ambiguous agreement. Another illustration of a si~uation resulting in restitution is that where the parties to a transaction believed erroneously that they have entered into a contract with each other and money
was paid or services rendered under the supposed contract. It is obvious that a duty of restitution should arise. 52 The doctrine is well
illustrated by the facts of Meem--Haskins Coal Corporation v. Pratt, 53
where there was a misunderstanding as to the price to be paid for
certain stone work done by plaintiff for defendant, the contractor believing he was to receive $r.50 per cubic foot, the owner that he was to
pay $13.50 per cubic yard. The court ruled that the contractor should
recover on a quantum meruit, saying that "Under such circumstances,
the law presumes that the defendant agreed to pay the reasonable
value of the services." As previously noted,5 4 the court described this
as a "contract implied in fact," which seems difficult to sustain.
5. Compromises. Where parties compromise a dispute, ordinarily
the compromise cannot be rescinded for mistake, since by their agreement of compromise the parties have intended to assume the risk of a
mistake as to the matter compromised.55 Indeed, one may assume the
risk of a mistake even though no compromise is involved. Thus in
Aldrich v. Travelers Insurance Co.,56 the deceased, aged 67, paid defendant $5,ooo for an annuity contract to pay her $3 I. 70 monthly during
her life. She died of cancer in less than a year. On a bill to rescind the
transaction for mutual mistake as to the state of her health ( no one
knew she had a cancer) and for unconscionableness the court, reversing
the decree below, held for defendant on the ground that the parties
had assumed the risk.
On the other hand, if a compromise agreement was itself based
upon an assumed basic fact as to which both were mistaken, it may be
rescinded because of such underlying mistake. A payment made upon
a life insurance policy is not recoverable upon discovery that the insured
is still alive where there was doubt or the insurer assumed the risk of
that contingency, usually by way of an agreement of compromise.57
unknown and unanticipated injuries, or damages» which language had been held to
preclude a recovery in Berry v. Struble, 20 Cal. App. (2d) 299, 66 P. (2d) 746
(1937).
,
62
See 1 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 71 (a) (1932); RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§§ 15, 40, and comment c and illustration (5) (1937).
58
299 Ky. 767, 187 S.W. (2d) 435 (1945).
54
45 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1947).
55
Harrell v. Nash, 192 Okla. 95, 133 P. (2d) 748 (1942).
56
317 Mass. 86, 56 N.E. (2d) 888 (1944).
57
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § II (1) (1937).
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The rule is otherwise, however, where the payment is made under
mutual mistake as to the death of the insured as to which there was no
doubt. Thus in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Cudd/ 8 payment was made
to the beneficiary of a policy, both parties believing mistakenly that the
insured was dead, inasmuch as the ship on which he was employed
had long been overdue and presumably lost or sunk by enemy action.
Restitution was allowed of this payment when it later appeared that
the insured was a prisoner of war in Japan.
In Deibel v. Kreiss,5 9 plaintiff, as his fee in an action to contest a
will, took an assignment of a 2 5 per cent interest in any recovery that
might be made. The contest was successful, but the inventory revealing that the net value of ~he estate was very small, plaintiff accepted as his fee a somewhat smaller percentage. Subsequently a savings
bank account of the deceased amounting to upwards of $4,500 came to
light. Held that plaintiff properly sued at law to collect the balance
of his fee since he was entitled to rescind his accord and satisfaction and
have restitution of the status quo ante because of the mutual mistake as
to a material fact. 60
An extreme but doubtless sound decision is Farhat v. Rassey,61
where the parties to a law suit, after the case had been submitted to
the trial judge, settled the claim for $ I ,400, not knowing that the
judge had already filed his opinion awarding the plaintiff $3,933.33.
Plaintiff's motion to repudiate the settlement and to enter a decree on
the findings of the trial court was granted, the court pointing out that
this was not a mistake of a doubtful, disputed, unassumed fact leading
to the compromise, but that the basic assumption upon which the settlement .rested was wrong in fact. Thus the state of mind of all the parties
at the time of the settlement was not in accord with the fact that the
judge had rendered his decision.
It is difficult, however, to sustain United States v. Garland,62 where
plaintiff surrendered to defendant his life and disability insurance policy by exercising a cash surrender option included therein, in mutual
58

208 S.C. 6, 36 S.E. (2d) 860 (1945).
(Ohio App. 1943) 50 N.E. (2d) 1000.
60
Quoting 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, § 1570 (1936). "Where a mistake as to
the quantity, quality, or characteristics of the subject of a bargain is due to a mutual'
mistake regarding some means or measures which the parties took for fixing the quantity, quality or value of the performance rendered by one party, it seems clear that there
may be a rescission."
61
295 Mich. 349, 294 N.W. 707 (1940).
62
(C.C.A. 4th, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 118, cert. den., 314 U.S. 685, 62 S.Ct. 189
{1941).
59
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ignorance of the fact that plaintiff had been permanently and totally
disabled. The court denied plaintiff's suit to rescind the transaction
for mutual mistake and enforce the disability provisions, on the ground
that this was not a case of mutual mistake of fact, but an ordinary resolution of a doubtful claim.68
6. Mistake as to area on sale of land. Cases involving fraud or
mutual mistake as to the acreage of land sold by one party to another
continue to arise where restitution is granted because the payor was
mistaken as to the extent of his duty under the contract. 64 The general
rule is that if the sale was specifically at so much per acre or other
unit any overpayment is recoverable when the acreage is found to be
less than what the seller had represented or what the parties had both
believed.65 Although relief is usually granted by action of assumpsit,
this is in substance a form of reformation.66 Where the sale was manifestly a sale by the tract, or "in gross," the purchaser is usually without remedy since he is deemed to have assumed the risk of a deficiency.
But the discrepancy may be so great as to give rise to an inference
of fraud in which case, of course, the purchaser at his election may
rescind the transaction or sue for damages.
The troublesome question is to determine whether the sale was
really at so much per acre or other unit or one where the price was
determined by the supposed acreage on the one hand, or on the other
hand was a true sale in -gross. The most thorough analysis yet worked
out is that of the Kentucky decisions of which the latest exponent is
Humphries 'V. Haydon. 67 Here on a transaction involving the transfer of a farm of a specified number of acres restitution of an overpayment was allowed when a survey revealed a deficiency of nearly 13
per cent. The court said in part:
"The law of Kentucky with reference to the quantity or area
of land sold in gross was laid down definitely by Chief Justice
Robertson I IO years ago in Harrison v. Talbot.... Transactions
were classified into four kinds and the legal remedies for each was
defined. That law has become a rule of property in the sense that
68

The case is criticized in 42 CoL. L. REv. 482 (1942).
As is pointed out in RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§ 21 and comment a (1937).
65
Ford v. Coles, 278 Ky. 131, 128 S.W. (2d) 609 (1939).
66
See Evans v. Renfroe, (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 170 S.W. (2d) 636, where
reformation of a lease and restitution of overpayments already made was granted.
67
297 Ky. 219, 179 S.W. (2d) 895 (1944). The IO per cent rule as stated
in this case does not apply where the sale is in terms by the acre or other unit. See
cases cited in I 53 A.L.R. IO ( I 944) •
64
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it has been recognized by the courts as being a part of every conveyance of land. Many cases have arisen in which there was difficulty in determining whether the particular sales were within the
second or the third category. The former embraces a sale by the
tract in which a supposed or estimated quantity of land was mentioned or referred to in the contract, but only as being descriptive
and under such circumstances as to show that the parties intended
to risk the contingency of quantity. The latter embraces a sale in
which it was made evident by certain extraneous circumstances,
conduct and conversations that the parties did not contemplate or
intend to risk more than the usual rates of excess or deficiency in
similar transactions or as might reasonably be regarded as within
the range of the ordinary contingency. It has also become a rule
of property of the same character that IO per cent of the quantity the land was represented to contain is the criterion of the
reasonable or ordinary contingency; in other words, that if the
difference is IO per cent or more, the party suffering the loss is
entitled to redress, which in an executed transaction is ordinarily
the right to recover the proportionate sum paid. The idea is that
the disparity is so great as probably not to have been within the
contemplation of the parties, and the principle that one will not
be permitted to get something for nothing. The law raises an
implied contract to adjust the matter on the basis of mistake or
deceit." 68
The opposite situation, where there is a large excess of land sold
by the acre, came up in another late Kentucky case, McGeorge v.
White. 69 Here White by letter offered Mrs. McGeorge $50 an acre
for her land, saying that he understood it contained about ten ,·acres.
She accepted the offer, writing him "I have no idea how many acres
I have, but I guess there is ten or more acres." White sent his check
for $250 promising to pay the balance on receipt of the deed. A survey revealing that the land contained 17 1/3 acres, White refused to
go on. Mrs. McGeorge sued him for specific performance. He denied
liability and sought restitution of his $250. The court decided in favor
of White, stating, first, that there had been no meeting of the minds
on this material part of the subject matter of the contract,7° and secondly, that even if the transaction was not in fact a sale by the acre,
in any event an excess of 73 per cent over the estimated acreage was
68
69

297 Ky. 219 at 220-221, 179 S.W. (2d) 895 (1944).
295 Ky. 367, 174 S.W. (2d) 532 (1943).

70

The soundness of this analysis seems questionable.
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beyond what the parties had intended to risk. Obviously, this is a just
decision, since otherwise great hardship might result. 11
Whether the rate per acre should be reclaimed, for a deficiency
is not entirely clear where the land conveyed has on it valuable improvements. In Stuart v. Denman,12 on a sale for $r5 per acre of a
tract mistakenly believed to contain r,600 acres there was a deficiency
of substantially roo acres. The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the
value of the buildings, $ro,ooo, should be deducted from the purchase
price of $24,000 before computing the amount to be recovered. On
appeal the Supreme Court reversed this ruling, 78 pointing out that it
'was clear that the parties had spread the value of the improvements
out over r ,600 acres and determined that the value of each acre was
$r5. It may be doubted that such a result would be reached in all
cases. Suppose, for example, that on the sale of a house and lot the
seller believes that it contains two acres, it later develops that the lot
contains but one acre. Would the court permit the vendee to buy the
house at half price just because the lot was only half as large as the
parties had believed it to be?
Perhaps a fairer rule in a case involving improvements or land of
equal value would be to allow restitution of the di:ff erence between
the price paid and the value of what the vendee actually received as
of the date of the sale.74
The same principle was applied in Evans v. Renfroe. 15 Plaintiff
leased from defendant a ranch at a rental of 7 5 cents per acre. Plaintiff
had paid defendant his rent in the mutually mistaken belief that the
ranch contained 4480 acres whereas it later appeared that there were
only 3 8 r 5 acres. Restitution of the overpayment was allowed. The
courts also reformed the lease to include a recital of the true acreage
and the rental due. Indeed it is submitted that the restitution granted
is in substance a reformation of so much of the transaction as has been
71 The annotation to this case in I 53 A.L.R. 4 ( I 944) says that the decision
stands alone in allowing rescission on such facts and that a number of cases have required
the purchaser to pay the extra sum claimed by the vendor, although courts have sometimes allowed a vendor to rescind unless the_ vendee pays for the excess in acreage,
Lawrence v. Staigg, 8 R.I. 256 {1866), or have allowed the vendor to recover back
a proportionate part oCthe land conveyed to the vendee. Sevreau v. Frazer, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916) 189 S.W. 1003.
72
{Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 172 S.W. (2d) 164.
78
Denman v. Stuart, 142 Tex. 129, 176 S.W. (2d) 730 (1944).
74
ln Murphy v. Boyt, (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) 180 S.W. (2d) 199, the per acre
price was recovered for a deficiency, the court noting that all the land was of the
same value.
75
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 170 S.W. (2d) 636.
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consummated in order to make it conform to the intention of the parties.
Sometimes a mutual mistake as to the extent of work required
under a contract will entitle a contractor to recover an additional sum
for the extra work. 76 Thus in Transbay Construction Company v. City
and County of San Francisco,7 7 the plaintiff contracted to do the excavating for the foundation of a dam. Relying upon the defendant's
honestly made estimate of 30,000 cubic yards to be removed, plaintiff
made a corresponding bid. In fact, it was necessary to excavate 84,000
cubic yards. It was admitted that the defendant's estimate was as good
as could have been made and there was no claim of misrepresentation.
Finding that "circumstances unanticipated by the parties made radical
changes in the character and amount of the work-, greatly increasing
the expense," the court ruled that the contract should be deemed "abrogated" and a recovery allowed on a quantum meruit basis.78
7. Gratuity conferred under mistake. A gift, being a non-contractual
transaction, is rescindable for a material mistake on the part of the
donor, particularly if there was non-disclosure of essential facts on the
part of the donee. Thus in Conkling's Estate v. Champlin,79 a
claimant who had for years paid an elderly and blind widow $ mo a
month under the misapprehension that she was in necessitous circumstances was allowed restitution from her estate.
Another instance of a gratuity conferred under mistake is Byrd v.
Byrd. 80 Here upon a divorce exclusive custody of a child was awarded
to the wife and the husband was charged with an allowance for its
support. Subsequently the wife and her second husband adopted the
child, which relieved the father of his duty of support. In ignorance
of the adoption he continued his allowance. The court granted restitution of the support payments made after the adoption as made "under
a mistake of fact, or at the most a mistake of mixed law and fact." 81
76

See 46 M1cH. L. REv. 225 (1947).
(D.C. Cal. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 433.
78
The note on this case in 51 YALE L.J. 162 (1941) suggests that a simpler
method would be to limit the scope of the contract to the work contemplated by the
parties at the time of the contract was executed and to allow a quasi-contractual recovery
for the "new and different work" as is sometimes done. The problem is somewhat
like that as to the validity of an additional contract to pay for such unexpectedly
burdensome work. See Lange v. United States for Use of Wilkinson, (C.C.A. 4th,
1941) 120 F. {2d) 886; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. H. W. Nelson Co., lnc.,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1941) n6 F. {2d) 823; Watkins & Son, Inc. v. Carrig, 91 N.H. 459,
21 A. {2d) 591 (1941).
79
193 Okla. 79, 141 P. (2d) 569 (1943).
80
{Ohio App. 1945) 69 N.E. (2d) 75.
81
The case falls clearly within "Mistaken Belief as to Existence of a NonContractual Duty to Pay," RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 19 (1937).
77
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8. Mistaken belief that a security or claim will result or be terminated. Where a person transfers money or property to another in the belief that he will get something in return and does not, equitable principles
require that he 'should be placed back, as nearly as may be, into his
original position. Here it is sufficient that the benefit for which restitution is sought was conferred by reason of a unilateral mistake of the
claimant: 82 Thus, where an agent who has no authority to borrow
money, nevertheless does borrow money from a pers9n who mistakenly
believes that the agent has such power, and the agent then uses the
money so obtained to pay his principals' debts, or places it in his principals' bank account or remits the money to his principal, it is clear that
the principal has benefitted. Being the beneficiary of a windfall, justice requires that he make restitution. 83 On the other hand, where an
agent in excess of his authority borrows money, banks it in his principal's
name and promptly withdraws and makes off with it, having had
throughout an intention to obtain the money for his own purposes, it
is obvious that the mere temporary crediting of the fund to his principal's account constitutes no real benefit to the principal.84
An instance of restitution by means of subrogation is that where
money or property is fraudulently obtained from a claimant and used to
?2 Provided that the other party is not a bona fide purchaser for value or has not
changed his position or would otherwise be prejudiced by a judgment for restitution.
83
Duffy v. Scott, 235 Wis. 142, 292 N.W. 273 (1940) (Plaintiff furnished
collateral and joined with the defendant's agent in signing a note for $2,500, thus
enabling the agent to borrow money from a bank in the defendant's name. The agent
had no authority to borrow money. The bank credited the money to the principal's
bank account upon which the agent had authority to draw. He did this to make good
an amount which he had embezzled. The agent then transmitted to his principal a
check drawn on this account for a slightly larger amount, in payment of the balance
of the profits of the previous year. This check the defendant, in ignorance that it was
the product of the agent's unauthorized borrowing, deposited in his own bank and it
was duly paid. The agent soon after absconded, whereupon it came to light that
he had embezzled large sums from his principal. The bank sold plai1hi.ff's collateral
and applied the proceeds in payment of the note. Held, in an action for money had
and received, that, since "the defendant had received the avails of the $2,500 loan"
and thus the plaintiff had conferred a benefit on the defendant through mistake, the
defendant was liable to make restitution, citing the RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,
§§ 1, 6 and particularly l 5, together with illustration 8 and the Reporters' note
thereto (1937). The court also mentioned AGENCY RESTATEMENT, §§ 97 and 98
(193'3). Section 282 of the latter Restatement and in particular comment f thereon
might well have been cited.
84
See AGENCY RESTATEMENT,§ 282, comment g (1933). But see WOODWARD,
QUASI CONTRACTS, § 76 (1913).
In Sumner v. Knighton (La. App. 1941) I S. (2d) 142, the plaintiff failed to
show that money borrowed by an agent in excess of his authority was used for the
benefit of the principal.
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discharge a mortgage or other lien of an innocent obligor. In Wilson v.
Todd, 85 a husband used money acquired by fraud from plaintiff to
discharge a mortgage securing a debt on which he and his wife were
jointly liable. The claimant was properly subrogated to the rights of
the encumbrancer against the wife since the transaction had resulted in
her gratuitous enrichment by the discharge of the encumbrance, at the
expense of the defrauded plaintiff.86
In accord with the rule that one who pays money to or for the benefit of another in the mistaken belief that he thereby acquires a valid
right against that other is entitled to restitution,B 7 was the case of
Schram v. Burt.BB Burt and his wife were the owners of a building lot
as tenants by the entirety. To finance the building of a house on this
lot Burt obtained a bank loan giving a note and mortgage signed by
himself, but on which he forged the signature of his wife. The house
was built and occupied by the couple for several years. Default occurred and the husband died, whereupon for the first time the mortgagee and its assignee, the plaintiff, learned of the forgery. The court
awarded plaintiff restitution against the wife saying that the circumstances created an equitable mortgage ( which is "founded upon the
ancient cardinal maxim which regards that as done which was agreed
to be done and should have been done") since the husband's agency
to represent the wife both in building the house and in this loan transaction was clear. It is submitted that even without proof of such an
agency the lender should have been entitled to relief.
In Gladowski v. Felezak,80 an unincorporated lodge called the
"Nest" deeded to an incorporated club, having substantially the same
membership, certain land against which there was a judgment lien for
$3,000. The clubhouse on this land had been seriously damaged by
a flood. The club mortgaged the premises to plaintiff to secure a loan
of $6,999 to enable it to pay the judgment and restore the building.
After the judgment had been satisfied, the required repairs made and
$2,000 paid on account of the mortgage debt, it was discovered that
85

217 Ind. 183, 26 N.E. (2d) 1003 (1940).
The court said that since the wife after learning of the fact had failed to
disavow the acts of her husband she was deemed to have ratified them and was therefore
estopped to deny his authority to act for her. Is not this but another way of saying that
she had been unjustly enriched at the expense of the claimant? However, there is a
well-recognized doctrine that benefits received by the unauthorized act of one who
purports to be the recipient's agent must be restored unless the purported principal is
willing to adopt the transaction. See AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 99 (1933).
81
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 15 (1937).
.
88
(C.C.A. 6th, 1940) I I I F. (2d) 557.
89
360 Pa. 660, 31 A. (2d) 718 (1943).
86
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the conveyance from the lodge to the club was illegal a1-1d void, and
consequently that plaintiff's mortgage was also void. In granting
plaintiff an equitable lien upon the property in the amount of $4,000
and interest, the sum still due on the mortgage, the court said:"... the
mortgage money was used wholly for the benefit of the property which
has now been restored to the ownership and possession of the Nest....
If the Nest were to be allowed, without any equitable obligation on
its part, to hold the property freed of that judgment and with its clubhouse restored by the repairs made upon it, and plaintiffs were to be
denied the right to recover the money loaned by them in good faith and
used, in the manner indicated, for the .ultimate benefit of the Nest,
every proper conception of morals and fair dealing would be violated.
It is not as if the mortgage money had been devoted to the erection on
the premises of some structure or improvements which the Nest, as
owner, neither required nor desired." 90
Where by reason of a mistake of fact money has been paid to the
wrong person, if the payor has not already obtained restitution, the person actually entitled to the money may obtain it from the payee by
an action for money had and received. In DuBois v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company,91 moneys due a contractor had by
mistake been paid to the contractor's surety. The contractor had judgment against the surety.92
9. Restitution of taxes. The harsh rule of the common law that taxes
once paid under mistake and without duress are not recoverable from
the taxing authority 93 was dramatically illustrated in Pettibone v. Cook
County 94 where for forty-five years the plaintiff had paid upwards of
90
346 Pa. 660 at 663, 31 A. (2d) 718 at 719-720 (1943). Citing RESTITUTION
RESTATEMENT, §§ 43 (3), 161, 162 (1937).
As to so much of the case as allowed plaintiff compensation for improvements, not
all courts would be so liberal, see infra, p. 1057.
91
341 Pa. 85, r8 A. (2d) 802 (1941).
92
The court cited RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 126 ( l 93 7).
93
Maricopa County v. Arizona Citrus Land Co., 55 Ariz., 234, IOO P. (2d) 587
(1940) (though mutual taxes on improvements upon adjoining land were assessed to
plaintiff and paid by him.) North Miami v. Seaway Corp., 151 Fla. 301, 9 S. (2d) 705
(1942) [no recovery of taxes paid under mistake of law without duress, citing 3
CooLEY ON TAXATION, 4th ed.,§ 1282 (1924)].
Recovery is often provided for by statute, Board of County Commissioners of
Morgan County v. Doherty, l 14 Colo. 594, 168 P. (2d) 556 (1946), although the
statutes are sometimes strictly construed. See note collecting authorities, l 6 5 A.L.R.
879 (1946).
94
(C.C.A. 8th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 850. It might perhaps. have been argued
that since the land taxed was not within the state, the usual rule justifying retention of
taxes was inapplicable.
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$11 ,ooo for annual real estate taxes levied by the defendant county on
certain islands situated in a boundary lake lying partly in Canada and
partly in the United States. The plat filed by the International Boundary Commission with the Secretary of State on October 27, 1931, determined that the islands in question were in Canada, but the plaintiffs
did not discover this nor did the General Land Office recognize the
newly determined boundary until 1934 when the Land Office filed its
supplementary plat. Action for restitution was brought in 1939. Relief
was denied on the ground that such payments as were not barred by
the Statute of Limitations were not recoverable, since in Minnesota a
tax, whether legally or illegally imposed, if paid without coercion or
imposition, is deemed voluntarily paid and, in the absence of a statute
otherwise providing, is not recoverable. The fact that there may be a
moral obligation supporting the claim does not change the rule.
A number of courts have recently accepted the view of the Restitution Restatement 95 that one who has paid taxes on land in the mistaken
belief of ownership may recover the sum so paid from the true owner
of the land to the extent that the tax could have been collected from
that owner and may have an equitable lien on the land or be subrogated
to the right of the taxing power against the true owner.96
95

See § 43 (1) and comment b and illustration 7 thereon, and §§ 161, 162
(1937).
96
Morrison v. Mansion Realty Company, 38 N.Y. S. (2d) 41 (1942). (Plaintiff
by mistake paid taxes on defendant's land. Although no money claim was enforceable
because the tax was merely a lien upon the land, plaintiff was entitled to be subrogated
to the right of the taxing authority as this requires no contract.)
Brookfield v. Rock Island Improvement Co., 205 Ark. 573, 169 S.W. (2d) 662
(1943) (Plaintiff under bona fide claim of title had paid taxes on defendant's land.,
Held, entitled to recover payments not barred by statute of limitations and to an
equitable lien on the land to secure such payments).
Hollywood, Inc. v. Clark, 153 Fla. 501, 15 S. (2d) 175 (1943) (these cases
holding contra "are inconsistent with our conception of justice and equity;" at 525).
Chapman v. Blackburn, 295 Ky. 606, 175 S.W. (2d) 26 (1943) [subrogation allowed, citing and following RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§ 162 (1937)]. Brownstin
v. Brelle, 3 Wash. (2d) 343, 101 P. (2d) 321 (1940).
Contra: Diehl v. Hanrahan, 68 Cal. App. (2d) 32, 155 P. (2d) 853 (1945)
(no relief, subrogation, available to one who mistakenly believed he has an interest in
the land). Franklin Building & Loan Co. v. Peppard, 97 Utah 483, 93 P. (2d) 925
(1939). Aragon v. Empire Gold Mining & Milling Co., 47 N.M. 299, 142 P. (2d)
539 (1943) (hardly more than a dictum). Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Dorman, 112 Ind. App. III, 41 N.E. (2d) 661 (1942), noted in 41 M1cH. L. REV.
II88 (1943).
In Home Owners' Loan Corp v. Murdock, 1 50 Pa. Super. 284, 28 A. ( 2d)
498 (1942), a mortgagee of part of a tract who had purchased the mortgaged tract of
foreclosure and had paid taxes due on the entire tract was denied relief against a bona
fide purchaser of that part of the tract not covered by the mortgage. The court dis-
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A troublesome question arose in an Arkansas case where the mortgagee of a life tenant, having paid taxes thinking that the mortgagor
owned the fee, was granted an equitable lien on the land enforceable
·by subrogation of the plaintiff to the right of the taxing authority. 97
A vigorous dissent pointed out that the payment of the taxes was of no
real benefit to the remainderman, since "by paying taxes for the life
tenant the plaintiff has deprived the remainderman of his statutory
right to declare a forfeiture of the life estate."
Io. Improvements. There has long been a controversy as to the right,
if any, of one who under mistake as to ownership or authority makes
improvements on the land of another. An unfortunate decision, in the
opinion of the writer, is Lauffer v. Vial,98 where the defendant's son
had no authority in writing as was required by the local Statute of
Frauds, made an oral lease of defendant's land to plaintiff in consideration of plaintiff's agreement to clear the land and make it fit for agriculture. The plaintiff cleared the land, but defendant refused to ratify
the lease. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled t.o compensation for
the value of his services, since "it does not appear that defendant had
knowledge of any agreement or proposed lease, or that she had reason
to know of plaintiff's purpose upon her lands, or that she knew he
expended money and labor thereon under the belief that he had an
agreement with defendant which was non-existent." 99
The case of improvements made by a trespasser, however innocent
he may be, is less strong where there is no relation of agency, even
though that agent acts in excess of his authority. In Matter of City of
0
Jyew York, I 57th Street Queens,1° it appeared that one Norton, having
probated a will under which she was devisee of certain land, borrowed
money from a bank on a mortgage loan guaranteed by the Federal
Housing Administrator, which money was spent on improvements.
Subsequently, the will was set aside for duress, fraud and undue influence, and a prior valid will was probated under which Royster was the
devisee of the land. The Federal Housing Authority paid the mortgage
debt to the lender bank and took an assignment of the bank's default
tinguished the case from the rule laid down in RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 43
(1) (1937).
97
Holloway v. Bank of Atkins, 205 Ark. 598, 169 S.W. (2d) 868 (1943).
There is a conflict as to whether taxes mistakenly paid to the wrong tax district within
a state are recoverable. See note 94 A.L.R. 1223 (1935).
98
153 Pa. Super. 342, 33 A. {2d) 777 (1943).
99
153 Pa. Super. 34.z at 346, 33 A. (2d) 777 (1943). The court also suggested
that a clearing of ground preparatory to plowing and sowing is not a permanent improvement inuring to defendant's benefit.
100
257 App. Div. 511, 13 N.Y.S, {2d) 587 (1939).
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judgment against Norton on her notes. It was held that the Federal
Housing Authority was not entitled to an equitable lien on the land
since its claim was through Norton, a trespasser. A dissenting judge
took the view that "Royster had no equitable right to profit at the
expense of the Federal Housing Authority to the extent of $1,500 for
the wrong done by Norton." 101
A more satisfactory conclusion is reached by the Supreme Court
of Oregon in Jensen v. Probert,102 in which state there was no pertinent
statute. The minority doctrine first announced by Story, J., in Bright
v. Boyd,1°3 and followed in Michigan,104 that relief may be had in
equity at suit of the occupier against the true owner, was expressly approved. However, since in the instant case the owner had himself
brought suit in equity to quitt his title, the court finally relied upon the
well recognized rule that he who ·seeks equity must do equity. By
way of relief, as the building erected by the trespassing improver was
small and without a basement and was not claimed by the landowner,
the court directed that a mandatory injunction issue requiring the
trespasser to remove his building and to restore the land to its former
condition, a refreshing illustration of the elasticity of the equitable decree, instead of the usual remedy of giving the owner an option to
make compensation for the improvement or else release the land to
the improver upon his payment of its value exclusive of the improvement.105
I I. Improvements before judgment reversed. As to the right to receive compensation for improvements made by one in possession of
land pursuant to a judgment of sale, which judgment was subsequently
reversed, there is a conflict of authority. The purchaser is of course
entitled to restitution of his purchase money and reimbursement for
taxes paid by him. In justice, since he was in no sense a wrongdoer, he
should also be recompensed to the extent that his improvements have
increased the value of the land and occasionally he is given such compensation.106
101 A note in 40 CoL. L. REv. 145 (1940), suggests that the dissenting judge
was right in saying that the Federal Housing Authority, as assignee of the judgment
against Norton who had an apparent record title, was in the position of a bona fide
purchaser rather than that of a trespasser.
102 174 Ore. 143, 148 P. (2d) 248 (1944).
103 l Story 478, 4 FED. CAs., No. 1875 (1841).
104 Hardy v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 232 N.W. 200 (1930).
105 Many, statutes allow relief to an innocent trespasser who has color of title.
106 See, allowing compensation, Kidd v. Roundtree, 285 Ky. 442, 148 S.W. (2d)
275 (1941); Varnell v. Lee, 236 Iowa 445, 19 N.W. (2d) 205 (1945). Contra,
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In Krahenbuhl v. Clay,1° 1 one who in good faith made improvements while he was in possession as purchaser under a tax sale, subsequently declared by the court to be void, was allowed the enhancement
thereby caused in the value of the land to the true owner thereof.
In Anderson v. Connolly,108 the court denied recovery for improvements made by a mortgagor who remained in possession after foreclosure, saying: "If he thought the foreclosure was good, he had no
reason to believe that he still retained title to the property. If, however,
he thought the foreclosure was invalid, then he could not under the
Betterment Acts have any claim for improvements again~t the mortgagee."
Maedel v. Wies, 309 Mich. 424, 15 N.W. (2d) 692 (1944). See also I GLENN,
MORTGAGES,§ 93.2 (1943).
A note in 41 CoL. L. REv. 1272 (1941) discussing the problem, points out
that in Golde Clothes Shop v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 236 N.Y. 465, 141 N.E.
917 (1923), a tenant who had been wrongfully deprived of the remaining two years
of his ten year lease by a judgment of ouster subsequently reversed, was not required
to pay for costly improvements whereby his little shop had been turned into an
entrance to a movie theatre, since the improvements "did not increase the value of the
[tenant's] interest." Other cases, however, deny compensation even though the
improvement has benefitted the other party.
107
346 Mo. I I I , 139 S.W. (2d) 970 (1940).
108
310 Mass. 5, 36 N.E. (2d) 404 (1941).

